Three Articles Removed Under Pressure
Texts that prompted a strong reaction from regional authorities after the 2021 protests
Context
On January 17, 2021, opposition politician Alexei Navalny returned to Russia after receiving medical treatment in Germany following a poisoning attempt. He was detained immediately upon arrival. The next day, Navalny posted a video message urging supporters to protest on January 23. That day, protests occurred in 198 cities across Russia and in 95 cities abroad. A second wave of demonstrations happened on January 31.

In the days leading up to the protests, Russian authorities openly threatened citizens, warning them against participating in what they called “illegal rallies” and warning of serious consequences. Despite this, people took to the streets. In several cities, clashes with police broke out, accompanied by mass arrests.
State propaganda provided an easy explanation: the protests, it claimed, were caused by “schoolchildren” supposedly organized by Navalny’s team via TikTok.
Why These Articles Were Written
In 2021, I led the Tula office of the national media Moskovsky Komsomolets. I reported on the pro-Navalny protests and did not observe any schoolchildren among the demonstrators.
What I saw were young adults: thoughtful, politically aware individuals who would soon face the consequences of longstanding issues in the country.

After the protests, I held a thematic discussion at the newspaper’s editorial office with young politicians and political analysts. I asked them how they personally understood the protests — their causes, significance, and possible outcomes. Following this discussion, three articles were published on the newspaper’s website.
Why They Were Removed
The publications sparked a strong reaction from regional authorities. The governor of Tula Region, Alexei Dyumin, and the regional leader of the ruling United Russia party, Nikolai Vorobyov, demanded that the newspaper’s owner remove the articles and dismiss me from my role as editor-in-chief. Meanwhile, the regional office of the Federal Security Service (FSB) was asked to open “some kind of criminal case” against me.

This reaction left little doubt: the articles contained an uncomfortable truth — one that regional and federal officials found deeply threatening. That truth was voiced not by professional opposition activists but by young, educated Russian citizens — precisely the group whose loyalty and influence state propaganda was actively courting.
Why I Am Republishing Them Now
I am republishing these articles here, in their original form and with English translations, for both Russian and international audiences. They have since been removed from the Moskovsky Komsomolets in Tula website. This section is an attempt to return to the public sphere texts that proved too honest for the realities of regional Russian politics in the early 2020s.
Glossary and Notes
- Tula Region — a federal subject of the Russian Federation located in the European part of Russia, with a population of approximately 1.5 million. The region has a long-standing specialization in weapons manufacturing. I was born and raised here; my parents moved to Tula from Ukraine.
- Moskovsky Komsomolets in Tula — the regional branch of Moskovsky Komsomolets, a major Russian federal socio-political media holding.
- United Russia — a nationwide political party founded in 2001 to consolidate a centralized ruling party. Commonly referred to as the “party of power” or “Putin’s party.”
ARTICLES

“They Don’t Hear Us!” Tula Youth on Protests in Support of Navalny
Tula — January 2021
In January 2021, protests in Tula challenged the city’s reputation for political calm. While officials dismissed the demonstrators as “TikTok schoolchildren,” this article looks at what the protests actually revealed about young people.

“Political Parties Should Use Protest,” Young Political Scientists in Tula Say
Tula — February 2021
Russia’s party system is often described as stable. For many young political activists in Tula, it looks more like stagnation. This article follows a discussion on trust, protest, and whether parties still offer any real path for change.

Reaching Out to Representatives: Why Tula Youth Are Disappointed in the Youth Parliament
Tula — February 2021
The Youth Parliament was meant to connect young citizens with the authorities. In practice, many in Tula see it as an empty structure. This article examines why officially sanctioned channels of dialogue fail to build trust — and why frustration continues to grow instead.