In the summer of 2019, the Tula region was preparing for local elections. The authorities relied on legal pressure, spoiler parties, and controlled media to keep the campaign in check. However, the Communist Party remained a troublesome opponent, and the city’s political scene briefly centered on a candidate on hunger strike in Lenin Square. Tula,…
The designation of the human rights movement “Memorial” as an extremist organization and the ban on its activities in Russia are not isolated developments. They reflect a profound transformation within the Russian state and society. This is not merely about suppressing dissent. The deeper issue is the rehabilitation of Stalinism as a model of governance—and, increasingly, as a social norm.
Under Governor Alexei Dyumin, the control system over regional media in the Tula region was fully established. Government contracts for “information coverage” of official activities effectively became a way of buying editorial loyalty. This chapter explains how that system worked — and how journalism gradually shifted from relying on readers to depending on government officials.
After twelve years of teaching political science at my university, I unexpectedly received an invitation to visit the United States from the U.S. State Department’s political section. However, the American diplomats were not the only ones interested in the trip. Officers from Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) also wanted to know why I had been invited—and what connections I might have with the Americans.
After Alexei Navalny returned to Russia in January 2021, protests erupted nationwide. In Tula, covering these protests meant working under pressure and facing the constant threat of detention.